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Abstract
I study a search economy in which intermediaries are the driv-
ing force co-ordinating the economy on the use of a unique, common
medium of exchange for transactions. If search frictions delay trade,
intermediaries o¤ering immediate exchange opportunities can make
arbitrage gains from a price spread. As these intermediaries take over
transactions, they are confronted to the double coincidence problem of
the search market. In the model presented here, intermediaries solve
this problem best by imposing a common medium of exchange to other
agents, such that a Cash-in-Advance constraint results: Agents trade
twice in order to consume, once to exchange their production against
the medium of exchange, and once to receive their consumption good.
To select between multiple equilibria, I introduce a criterion of min-
imal coalition proofness, whereby arbitrarily small coalitions may in-
duce a change from one equilibrium to another. I show that any min-
imally coalition-proof equilibrium is Pareto-e¢cient, and characterize
the full set of minimally coalition-proof equilibria of this economy.
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11 Introduction
This paper examines the joint role of intermediation and money in organizing
exchanges in an economy where many agents decide independently, simulta-
neously and repeatedly on the transactions they want to carry out. I extend
the model …rst studied by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and propose a simple
form in which agents may forgo production opportunities and rather act as
intermediaries.
Traditionally, economic theory views intermediation and the use of media
of exchange as di¤erent and competing forms of dealing with the frictions that
result from decentralized decision-making on production, consumption and
exchange. Starting with Starr (1972), the literature on monetary exchange
emphasizes the role of money in a decentralized economy, where exchange
may be subject to search frictions, i.e. producers cannot immediately sell
their production to a ”market”. In such an economy, money overcomes the
problem of double coincidence of wants and reduces the time an agent has to
wait until he …nds a suitable trade partner. In more recent years, money has
been endogenously explained as the result of a cost minimization process,
where by agreeing on a common medium of exchange, traders can reduce
search costs. In equilibrium, no one has an incentive not to accept money, if
all others do.1
This approach can be criticized on several grounds. First, the monetary
equilibrium is only one of many equilibria in this type of environment. It
follows that hardly anything can be said about the characteristics of the
resulting medium of exchange. While the Kiyotaki-Wright framework pro-
vides a useful framework in which to analyze trading patterns, and thereby,
what kinds of goods end up being used as media of exchange, these search
economies lack mechanisms which lead to explicit coordination of transac-
tions and the selection of an equilibrium which promotes an e¢cient medium
of exchange. I shall argue informally further below, that many of the qual-
itative conclusions drawn from the Kiyotaki-Wright framework appear not
to be very robust, and under fairly general assumptions, any good could in
principle be used as money (independent of inherent qualities).2
Furthermore, the search economies hardly replicate empirical observa-
tions about money. While they succeed in explaining why it may be socially
1see, for example, Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) or Aiyagari and Wallace (1991)
2A more formal analysis of this argument will be provided in two companion papers,
see Hellwig (both forthcoming).
2e¢cient and individually rational that all agents use a common medium of
exchange, they cannot account for the fact that the vast majority of transac-
tions involves the exchange of goods for money. One of the conclusions from
the literature following Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) is that such a Cash-
in-Advance constraint where ”goods” are only traded for ”money”, fails to
materialize, since in an environment characterized by search frictions, there
is su¢cient incentive to accept ”goods” for further exchange, instead of im-
mediate consumption. In a sense, the same search frictions which motivate
the use of a medium of exchange render the existence of a Cash-in-Advance
constraint impossible.3
As a consequence, the existing search literature is in diametrical opposi-
tion to Walrasian equilibrium theory. Money has been introduced into Wal-
rasian models through a liquidity or Cash-in-Advance constraint, or more
generally by exogenously attributing it with some quality which other goods
don’t have.4 In these models, however, money derives value only from this
exogenous attribute, and by the very nature of Walrasian equilibrium theory,
there is a failure to endogenously account for its use. The conceptual incom-
patibility of money with general equilibrium theory lies in the structure of
frictionless, Walrasian markets, in which there is no clearly de…ned role for
bilateral exchanges, which call for the use of money.
A similar critique applies to the role of intermediation, both in pure search
and in perfectly frictionless economies: In search economies, there is no ex-
plicit role for intermediation as an economic activity, since the possibilities
for trade are exogenously given by the search process. Perfect markets on the
other hand cannot account for intermediation for the same reason as they
cannot account for money: Both are essentially non-Walrasian features which
arise through the bilateral nature of exchange. One can view intermediation
as an economic activity which by centralizing exchanges reduces frictions and
makes markets ”look as if” they were Walrasian. But then, why should there
be a need for money in a world in which intermediaries can deal with existing
market frictions (or vice versa)?
Historically, one observes, in apparent contradiction with the previous
3While this result obviously clashes with the observation of Cash-in-Advance con-
straints in quasi-perfect markets, it may have some intuitive appeal with respect to the
importance of barter trade in environments, in which markets are far from frictionless.
4See, for example, Lucas and Stokey (1987) for an example of a Cash-in-Advance
economy. Hellwig (1993) provides a detailed, critical discussion of the recent and not so
recent literature on monetary equilibrium theory, on which some of the ideas in this paper
are based.
3theoretical argument, that intermediaries have been a driving force in de-
veloping more e¢cient ways of exchanging goods, and particularly in intro-
ducing and using money in the economy. For instance, the development of
new …nancial instruments by …nancial intermediaries during the Renaissance
was essential to the promotion of trade in Europe. The uni…cation of mon-
etary standards simpli…ed organized trade between very remote provinces of
the Roman Empire. Many such examples throughout history seem to sup-
port the view that not only did the use of common monetary instruments
promote the development of organized intermediation in goods and …nancial
markets, but these instruments were often developed and introduced by the
intermediaries themselves.
This paper gives a rationale for the complementarity of money and inter-
mediation in organizing exchanges. I consider an inherently non-Walrasian
economy, where exchange is subject to search frictions. I assume, however,
that agents can modify the trading environment by acting as intermediaries.
Trade with intermediaries is not subject to search frictions, and delays in
trade only depend on the intermediaries’ ability to accommodate the trans-
actions demanded by other agents. I show that in this context, intermediaries
can introduce a common medium of exchange to all other agents. They, in
turn, are willing to use it, if it allows them to buy from the intermediary
whatever good they want to consume. On the other hand, intermediaries
can more easily respond to their task of centralizing exchanges, if a common
medium of exchange is used by the agents with whom they trade.
Intermediaries have been introduced into search models in the past.5 All
these models focus on the exchange of a single good with a given number
of buyers and sellers, who all want to make their transaction as quickly as
possible, and at the best price they can obtain. In these models, intermedi-
aries o¤er immediate exchange, and live o¤ a price spread between bid and
ask price. This intuition can easily be extended to economies with many
commodities. The success of intermediaries then depends on their ability to
match buyers and sellers. It is important to note that if intermediaries faced
no limits to the extent to which they can perform exchanges, i.e. if they could
trade with all goods of the economy at once, there would be no need for a
medium of exchange. Consumers could simply trade their excess demand in
all goods at once with an intermediary, at the prices set by the latter. If
the intermediary …xes market-clearing prices, then no medium of exchange
5Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) explore this aspect in a search-theoretic model, in
which one good is traded between buyers, sellers and intermediaries. Although di¤erent
in its aims, the present analysis is closer in spirit to Gehrig (1993).
4is needed to buy some goods from a di¤erent intermediary. If on the other
hand, intermediaries are restricted to exchange only a limited amount of
goods, either because some goods are not easily traded through an interme-
diary, or because there are decreasing returns to the scale of goods with which
an intermediary trades, then the excess demand of goods by an individual
from an intermediary may not have a value of 0 at market-clearing prices.
In this case, a medium of exchange serves consumers to transfer wealth from
exchanges with one intermediary to exchanges with another. Intermediaries
thus face a double coincidence problem, which they can solve by introducing
and promoting a common medium of exchange.6
In the search-theoretic environment considered here, the introduction of
intermediaries alters the way trade decisions are made by other agents. Trade
with intermediaries enables consumers and producers to direct their search
towards a particular good, as opposed to the random search in economies
without intermediation. By limiting their clients’ choices to the use of a
unique, common medium of exchange, intermediaries can introduce its use
to the entire economy. In an equilibrium of the economy considered here,
all agents trade twice to acquire what they want to consume: once to ob-
tain the medium of exchange (sell their production), and once to buy their
consumption good. E¤ectively, a Cash-in-Advance constraint for exchange
with intermediaries is introduced. In addition, as the medium of exchange
enables intermediaries to match buyers and sellers, agents face no waiting
time to perform the exchange they want to perform. As a result, the search
market empties, since most producers and consumers take advantage of the
intermediaries’ services. Equilibrium allocations bear the characteristics of
Walrasian allocations. The resulting transaction patterns resemble trade in
frictionless Walrasian markets: At any time, almost all agents are able to
trade in every period, and consume in every other (unless they produce or
consume the common medium of exchange, and only need one transaction).
More importantly, and in contrast with pure search economies, intermedi-
6From an empirical perspective, Radford’s (1945) description of how exchange devel-
oped in a Prisoners of War camp is very close to the present model. He describes how
economic institutions developed within the completely unorganized environment of a PoW-
camp, driven mainly by the scope for trade arising from di¤erences in endowments (Red-
Cross packages) and tastes. It is interesting to note that in the early days of the camp,
some individuals who exploited the price margins between di¤erent parts of the camp
(”intermediaries”) promoted and established the cigarette as common money. This was
fundamental for the later development of more sophisticated ”market” institutions inside
the camp, such as a store, and even the introduction of a paper money, backed by the
store’s inventories of goods.
5ation provides a mechanism by which the economy can explicitly coordinate
on the common use of an e¢cient medium of exchange. If an arbitrarily small
set of agents coordinates their activities and o¤ers some new organization of
transactions, they may induce other agents, and eventually the entire econ-
omy, to adopt their innovation. In view of the previous comments, this can
be assimilated to the historical role of intermediaries in developing more e¢-
cient means of exchange. It is shown here that small coordinated deviations
can induce Pareto e¢ciency. In addition, while innovation by arbitrarily
small coordinations does not entirely remove equilibrium indeterminacy in
the context of this model, I show that in any Pareto e¢cient equilibrium, all
producers trade twice in order to consume.7
The results presented here have several implications for the traditional
equilibrium models of monetary exchange. The Cash-in-Advance constraints
encountered here di¤er in important ways from those used in Walrasian mod-
els. In this context, Cash-in-Advance constraints result from equilibrium
trading strategies, rather than from some exogenous assumption driving the
model.
The e¢ciency of a Cash-in-Advance constraint in the present model re-
sponds to some of the critiques on the nature and use of Cash-in-Advance
constraints (the reader is referred to Hellwig 1993 for further discussion).
Viewing a constraint as e¢ciency enhancing seems contradictory. In fact,
e¢ciency results from the strategic interaction of intermediaries. It turns
out that the Cash-in-Advance constraint enables intermediaries to achieve
Pareto-e¢ciency in the trade process, if they can enforce it on all agents who
want to trade with them. The constraint is observed in all intermediated
exchange, but is not binding for exchange outside intermediation. Formally,
this model does not assume away the possibility that two agents exchange
”goods” for ”goods” outside intermediated transactions, but if all agents
agree to exchange with an intermediary, they almost never incur a situation
in which they can exchange ”goods” for ”goods”.
At this point, I would like to relate this work to a series of recent papers, in
order to clarify some of the objectives outlined in this introduction. Various
recent working papers use a ”trading-post” environment in order to analyze
7This does not imply that all agents use the most e¢cient medium of exchange in this
context. Due to the speci…cation of production here, small coalitions may not always be
able to break out of every equilibrium with ine¢cient media of exchange. A companion
paper (Hellwig, forthcoming) generalizes the approach chosen here and addresses this
short-coming, giving conditions under which the most e¢cient good is the unique medium
of exchange in equilibrium.
6transaction patterns similar to ours in a monetary setting. Iwai (1988) uses
this environment in a search-theoretical setting. In Howitt (2000) and Clower
and Howitt (2000), these trading posts represent intermediaries similar to
the ones encountered here. In their work, however, monetization results
from increasing returns to scale in the transaction process, which leads to
concentration on a small number of trading posts. Starr (1999), as well as
Starr and Stinchcombe (1999) examine an environment similar to Howitt and
Howitt and Clower, but do not formalize the activity of intermediation in the
same way. Again, monetization of trade follows from increasing returns, but
equilibrium trade patterns are derived di¤erently: Instead of focusing on price
competition among intermediaries in a fully dynamic setting, Starr (1999)
uses a tatonnement approach similar in spirit to a ”Walrasian auctioneer”.
He abstracts from the dynamics of repeated exchanges.
The present analysis di¤ers from these papers in several ways: Most
importantly, I emphasize the role of a double coincidence problem which
motivates intermediaries to promote a common medium of exchange. Sec-
ondly, this paper provides a fully dynamic analysis of the development of the
”trading-post” environment out of a search economy. The ”trading posts”
generate exchange opportunities only insofar as intermediaries become ac-
tive - the choice of becoming intermediary is itself endogenized in this model.
While much more intricate and complicated as a model, this environment pro-
vides a few simplifying insights: In equilibrium, the specialization between
production and intermediation takes place in such a way that intermediaries
maximize the number of transactions they carry out, and as a consequence,
no transactions take place as a result of pure search. Thus, from a much less
structured trading environment, we obtain the same transaction patterns
as those in the previously mentioned papers. Finally, by using the search-
theoretical framework as a background, we can give a strategic account as
to how intermediation develops and induces improvements in the transac-
tion process until at some point, transaction patterns and allocations closely
resemble Walrasian equilibrium allocations, as previously discussed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
basic economic environment. I consider a search economy a la Kiyotaki-
Wright (1989), in which agents can choose whether they want to produce
goods or act as intermediaries. An intermediary is an agent who can o¤er
immediate exchange between a pre-speci…ed pair of goods, one of which is
his own consumption good. Intermediaries agree to trade their consumption
good against the other good at a price of one for one, but are only willing
to pass on an amount less than one unit of their own consumption good for
7each unit of the other good they receive. The amount of trade intermediaries
can carry out is limited by their initial inventory of goods. In section 3, I
discuss strategy choices of all agents, and de…ne equilibria for this economy.
Section 4 considers one type of equilibrium, in which a particular good is
used as a common medium of exchange. I contrast the …ndings of the econ-
omy with intermediation with the monetary equilibria resulting from pure
search. In particular, it is shown that all exchange between goods and goods
disappears, when a common medium of exchange is used for exchanges with
intermediaries. Section 5 introduces an equilibrium re…nement in the form
of robustness with respect to minimal coalitions, and shows that any robust
equilibrium must be Pareto e¢cient. I then go on to characterize the full set
of robust equilibria. I conclude with some remarks on the general validity of
the approach chosen in this model as compared with others.
2 The economic environment
I consider an atomless probability space (­;¹) of in…nitely lived agents.
There are N ¸ 3 di¤erent goods and N types of agents in the economy.
An agent of type i only consumes good i, and never anything else. There is
am e a s u r eo f 1
N of each type.
In order to consume, an agent can engage in two di¤erent types of ac-
tivities. He can either act as a consumer-producer or as an intermediary. A
consumer-producer always holds one unit of a good, and tries to obtain, after
a sequence of one-for-one exchanges, his own consumption good i.H et h e n
consumes and immediately thereafter, he is endowed with one unit of good
(i + 1)modN. An intermediary does not produce, but can hold any arbi-
trarily large inventory of his own consumption good. He uses this inventory
to o¤er one prespeci…ed exchange of his consumption good i for some other
good j or vice versa. With every pair of trades, the intermediary increases
his inventory of good i by a fraction ¾ij that he retains when he sells a unit of
good i against one of good j. He can reduce his inventory by consuming. In
equilibrium, the proportion of agents engaging in each activity is determined
by an open entry condition.
The time-path of this economy is described in …gure 1. Time is discrete
and in…nite. Trade can take place in two ways in this economy. In every
period, a consumer-producer can choose to visit an intermediary. Every
intermediary is visible for all other agents in the economy, thus there is no
search cost involved in …nding a suitable intermediary. The intermediary























of size 1 ¡ ¾ij. During the period, he o¤ers these reduced units in exchange
against integer units of good j. These units of good j are further exchanged
against integer units of good i. The intermediary cannot store good j from
one period to the next, and in order to transform the integer units of good
i which he receives into reduced units which he can sell, he must store them
for at least one period. Thus, the intermediary will make sure he performs
the same number of exchanges in each direction, so that he doesn’t hold good
j at the end of a period. This number of two-way exchanges is bounded by
the initial inventory of good i,a sw e l la sb yt h en u m b e ro fa g e n t sw h ow a n t
to complete a transaction with him.
If the intermediary’s inventory is insu¢cient, or if there is a di¤erence
between the demand for exchanging good i for good j and the demand for the
opposite exchange, some agents will be unable to perform the exchange they
wished to carry out. In a second stage of the period, after all transactions
with intermediaries are completed, all agents, who could not trade, as well
as those who decided not to visit an intermediary during this period, are
bilaterally matched and thus have a second opportunity for exchange. In
such a random match, each agent observes what good the other agent holds.
Both then decide whether or not to accept the other agent’s good in exchange
for one’s own. Exchange takes place if both agents agree to it. At this point,
I make the usual assumption that agents cannot observe their trade partners’
trading histories, nor their types. As the matches are random, the probability
of encountering an i-consumer who holds good j (henceforth called ij-agent)
in such a meeting is given by the measure of ij-agents who enter the bilateral
matching stage.
At the end of each period, all agents decide on consumption, and on their
role during the following period. An intermediary can become consumer-
producer simply by consuming his entire inventory and producing one unit
of good i+1.A ni-consumer can become an intermediary whenever he holds
9his own consumption good, simply by forgoing consumption and using his
one unit as starting inventory for intermediation. There is no cost of setting
up or abandoning intermediation. After consumption and role choices, each
intermediary …xes his ”bite” ¾ij for the following period. All consumer-
producers observe these and choose which intermediary they want to visit
during the next period.
Preferences of agents are assumed to be symmetric across types. Con-
sumption utility is linear: An intermediary obtains an instantaneous utility
cU from consuming c units of his inventory. A consumer-producer obtains
utility U (1 ¡ ¾) from consuming a unit of his consumption good of size 1¡¾.
Consuming any other good yields 0 utility. Time is discounted by a factor
± smaller than but close to 1. Whenever an agent trades, he incurs a di-
rect transaction cost. Consumer-producers incur a cost of ¯i, whenever they
accept good i in a one-for-one exchange, or in a transaction with an inter-




° (k) from carrying out k
two-way exchanges of good i for good j. For simplicity, I let good 1 be the
good which has the lowest cost of acceptance. For expositional purposes, I let
° (k)=k + ®k(k ¡ 1). Any convex, increasing transaction cost technology
for intermediaries would yield the same results. Essentially, there are dimin-
ishing returns to scale in intermediation. In addition, ° (0) = 0 and ° (1)=1,
so that there is no …xed cost in setting up or maintaining intermediation.
Finally, some notation is needed: I denote by ¹ij the measure of ij-agents
and by ºij the measure of ij-intermediaries in the economy. The 2N(N ¡1)-
dimensional vector of all ¹ij and all ºij is the distribution of inventories and
role choices. The inventory of a generic ij-intermediary is denoted by kij,
the ”bite” by which i is reduced is denoted by ¾ij.
The main innovation here with respect to the original search-theoretical
model of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) is the formal introduction of inter-
mediation. Like their framework, this paper aims to analyze transaction
patterns and the emergence of media of exchange within a search economy.
This implies considering an environment, in which goods are durable, and no
commodity is predestined by its storability qualities to become a medium of
exchange. In other words, we do not want to assume existence of a durable
…at money which dominates perishable goods for transaction purposes (as
in Howitt 2000, for instance). Under this assumption, even for fairly special
cases like the one considered here, characterization of equilibria becomes ana-
lytically very di¢cult, if not impossible. Second, the potential coexistence of
intermediation with random search creates further notational and technical
10di¢culties. Again, this choice follows from the motivations set out initially.
It turns out that the way intermediation is introduced here leads to some
surprising simpli…cations for the analysis of equilibrium strategies. Bertrand
competition and open entry to (and exit from) intermediation ensure that
in the equilibria on which our analysis focuses (for reasons explained later
in section 5), search trade becomes inexistent so that all transactions will go
through intermediaries. Overall, these insights lead to considerable technical
simpli…cations and enable us to characterize equilibria simply in terms of
their transaction patterns for intermediated exchange. Also, one can easily
compare their welfare properties, and apply robustness analysis with respect
to small coalitions, as is being done in part 5.
3 Strategy choice and equilibrium
In this section, I derive optimal strategies of agents and de…ne the notion
of stationary equilibrium for this economy. Given that the set-up is geared
toward steady-state analysis, I consider the choice of inventories by interme-
diaries and the choice of trading strategies by consumer-producers separately,
and as stationary over time. In equilibrium, an indi¤erence condition between
both roles must hold, such that no agent has an incentive to change his ac-
tivity. I start by analyzing the behavior of intermediaries, taking as given
the distribution of inventories and role choices and the trading strategies of
consumer-producers.
3.1 Inventories of Intermediaries
Before the beginning of any period, an intermediary must choose his con-
sumption, or equivalently the inventory he wishes to maintain, as well as
the ”bite” ¾ which he charges. For the moment, I assume that there exists
¾ij, such that the intermediary can perform any arbitrary large number of
two-way exchanges, provided he charges ¾ · ¾ij, where as he will be un-
able to perform any two-way exchanges, if he charges ¾>¾ ij. Under these
conditions, the intermediary will always choose ¾ = ¾ij.
Let Wij (kt) be the supremum of life-time utility for an ij-intermediary
with an inventory of kt units of good i at time t. According to its de…nition,
W (kt) satis…es:
















11subject to the constraints







for s = t;t + 1;:::. [a] denotes the integer part of a real valued number
a. The per-period reward function in (1) is motivated as follows: Ucs gives
the utility of consuming cs at time s.A t t i m e s + 1, the intermediary can







. (2) gives the evolution of inventories from one period
to the next, while (3) gives the number of two-way trades during the fol-
lowing period. The discussion of this optimization problem is summarized
in proposition 1 and in the subsequent lemma, the derivation and proof of
which can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1:





(ii) There exists an integer ·ij,s u c ht h a t :
(a) whenever k?
s ¸ ·ij, k?
s+1 = ·ij
(b) for any inventory k?


























Proposition 1 contains the main information about optimal inventory
choice by intermediaries: There exists an optimal number of trades ·ij,a t
which the bene…t of one additional two-way exchange is outweighed by the
increase in transaction costs. This optimal inventory increases, as ¾ij in-
creases, and it goes to in…nity, as ® goes to 0, i.e. decreasing returns dis-
appear. Whenever an intermediary’s inventory exceeds this optimal number
of trades, it is optimal to immediately consume any inventory that is not
needed. Whenever an intermediary’s inventory is insu¢cient to perform the
12optimal number of two-way trades, the number of trades performed does not
decrease from one period to the next, and increases strictly, if the inventory
is su¢cient to accumulate one additional unit within one period. Lemma 1
considers the case where the gains from one period of trades are not su¢cient
to increase inventory by one additional unit.
Lemma 1: Suppose an intermediary holds k u n i t so fi n v e n t o r y ,a n dl e t
T ¸ 2 be the minimum number of periods needed to increase inventory by




±(° (k + 1) ¡ ° (k)) be the
per period increase in utility obtained from holding k + 1 units of inventory














then it is optimal to increase inventory from k to k + 1.
Lemma 1 states that even if integer increases in inventories cannot be
realized from one period to the next, intermediaries are happy to increase
their inventories, as long as the long-term gain in utility outweighs the cost
of forgoing short-term consumption. The second term in the expression is
negative, but converges to 0,a s± ! 1. Thus, in the no-discounting case,
the intermediary’s inventory will always be increased until the optimal level
is reached. Unless the marginal bene…t of the …nal two-way exchange is neg-
ligeable, the unique inventory level compatible with the notion of stationary
equilibrium is ·ij (determined in equilibrium by (4)). The indeterminacy that
might occur if the last two-way exchange yields low additional utility is due
to the non-convexity arising from the fact that the number of transactions
comes as an integer. For simplicity, I will therefore assume that an interme-
diary always builds up his inventory to the optimal number of transactions
·ij. This will be satis…ed in most cases of interest here, particularly, when
decreasing returns to scale set in slowly, and each intermediary is willing to
serve a large number of consumer-producers.
3.2 Trading strategies of consumer-producers
I now turn to the description of optimal trading strategies by consumer-
producers. A trading strategy for an ij-agent consists of two decision rules,
one that relates the current inventory to the choice of visiting an inter-
mediary, and one that indicates acceptance probabilities of exchanges in
a bilateral meeting. An ij-agent can choose to visit any jl-intermediary
13in the hope of exchanging good j for an integer good l,o rh ec a nc h o o s e
to visit an ij-intermediary and receive a reduced unit of his own consump-
tion good. This completes the set of feasible trading strategies for inter-
mediated exchange, as an ij-agent would not be willing to receive any re-
duced good l other than his own consumption good. Thus, for any inven-
tory, the set of feasible strategies for intermediated exchange is fully de-
scribed by the set f;;0;1;2;:::;Ng,w h e r e; is associated with the strat-
egy of not visiting an intermediary, 0 is associated with the choice of vis-
iting an ij-intermediary, and any l = 1;:::;N is assigned to visiting a jl-
intermediary. Formally, a trading strategy for intermediated exchange is a
function Ái : f1;2;:::;Ng£f 0;1;2;:::;Ng![0;1],w h e r eÁi (j;l) indicates
the probability assigned to strategy l (visiting a jl-intermediary, or visit-
ing an ij-intermediary, if l =0 )b ya nij-intermediary. Ái must satisfy PN
l=0 Ái (j;l) · 1, and the residual probability 1 ¡
PN
k=0 Ái (j;k) is assigned
to the strategy of not visiting an intermediary.
Similarly, trading rules for bilateral meetings are described by a function
¿i : f1;2;:::;Ng£f 1;2;:::;Ng![0;1],w h e r e¿i (j;k) indicates the proba-
bility that an ij-agent accepts good k for good j.W h e na nij-agent meets
an lk-agent, trade occurs with probability ¿i (j;k)¿l (k;j). To complete the
notation, ¼ij (k) denotes the probability that a consumer-producer receives
good k 2f i;jg when he visits an ij-intermediary. In a steady-state equi-
librium, they are determined by the consumer-producers’ trading strategies
fÁig
N
i=1 for trade with intermediaries, and by the distribution of inventories
and role choices, but I shall take them as given here.
Taking as given the ”bites” ¾ij, the trading probabilities ¼ij (k), trading





one can now derive an optimal trading strategy for a generic ij-agent as
a maximizer for a set of Bellman equations describing the choice of trade
strategies. Let Vi (j) be the expected life-time utility of an ij-agent. Vi(j)
satis…es:8
8One observes that this set of Bellman equations, as much of the preceeding section,
restricts attention to stationary trade strategy pro…les. A routine argument shows, how-
ever, that non-stationary strategies are weakly dominated in a steady-state equilibrium
with stationary strategies. In addition, standard results imply that under stationarity,
the solution to this set of Bellman equations is equivalent to the corresponding sequential
optimisation problem.





(Vi(l) ¡ ¯l ¡ Vi (j))Ái (j;l)¼jl(l)




























Ái (j;l)¼jl(l) ¡ Ái (j;0)¼ij (i)
!
¹0
ij denotes the measure of ij-agents who did not visit an intermediary,
and as a result enter a bilateral match. Before discussing the implications of
(5) in more detail, it is worth noting that one can abstract from consumption
choices: once an agent holds his consumption good, he can consume imme-
diately and hold on to his production good forever thereafter, which yields a
life-time utility of U. Trading good i against some other good is, obviously,
strictly dominated, so that any agent who receives his own consumption good
will consume immediately.
Several results follow from (5). One observes that for every consumer-
producer, not visiting an intermediary is a weakly dominated strategy. The
analysis of optimal strategies for trade with intermediaries and bilateral trade
can be separated. The following proposition summarizes the …ndings and
gives simple rules which optimal trading strategies have to satisfy:
Proposition 2: If (¿i;Á i) is an optimal trade strategy for a consumer-
producer of type i, then the following must be true:
(i) If Ái (j;k) > 0,t h e nk 2 argmaxl (Vi (l) ¡ ¯l ¡ Vi(j))¼jl(l),a n d
max
l
(Vi(l) ¡ ¯l ¡ Vi(j))¼jl(l) ¸ (Vi (i) ¡ ¾ijU ¡ ¯i ¡ Vi (j))¼ij (i)
15If k is a unique maximizer, then Ái(j;k)=1
(ii) If Ái (j;0) > 0,t h e n
(Vi(i) ¡ ¾ijU ¡ ¯i ¡ Vi(j))¼ij (i) ¸ max
l
(Vi (l) ¡ ¯l ¡ Vi(j))¼jl(l)
where Ái(j;0) = 1,i ft h ei n e q u a l i t yi ss t r i c t
(iii) If ¿?
i (j;k) > 0,t h e nVi (k) ¡ ¯k ¡ Vi (j) ¸ 0;
and Vi (k) ¡ ¯k ¡ Vi(j) > 0 implies ¿?
i (j;k)=1
While evident in its content, proposition 2 highlights the main di¤erence
between trade with intermediaries and random bilateral trade: Strategies
for the latter amount to simple decision rules indicating whether one good is
accepted in exchange for another, and agents might be willing to accept more
than one good in exchange for their current inventory. As a result, trading
patterns remain indeterminate, as there may be many possible sequences
of exchanges which lead a consumer-producer from his current inventory
to his consumption good. Trading with an intermediary enables him to
follow a di¤erent strategy and direct himself towards the one trade where
the expected surplus is maximized. The consumer-producer can follow a
predetermined sequence of intermediated exchanges in order to eventually
receive his consumption good, and if more than one such sequence occurs,
this implies that they yield the same expected value. This is very similar
to the deterministic trading zones in Iwai (1988), where agents need to visit
an ”ij-island” in order to trade good i for good j. However, there is a key
di¤erence: in Iwai (1988), frictions in trade depend on an exogenously given
search externality, whereas here, trade frictions are endogenized. Any delay
in trade results from the inability of intermediaries to accommodate all the
exchanges demanded by consumer-producers.
3.3 Stationarity and Role choices
To complete the description of how this economy behaves, one needs to con-
sider how the distribution of inventories and role choices evolves from one
period to the next, and how competition among intermediaries determines
the equilibrium measures of intermediation. I will …rst look at competition
among intermediaries.
Given the choice of ¾’s by all other intermediaries, there exists a level ¾ij
at which either ij-agents are indi¤erent between visiting an ij-intermediary
16and their best outside option, or the inventories of all intermediaries charging
¾ · ¾ij is exactly su¢cient to satisfy all possible two-way exchanges. In
either case, the intermediary will not perform any trades when he charges ¾>
¾ij, but is not constrained in his number of exchanges if he charges ¾ · ¾ij.
As all intermediaries of the same type face this same constraint, they will all
charge ¾ij in equilibrium. In addition, the possibility of undercutting implies
that in equilibrium, ¾ij and ·ij together satisfy condition (4):I fa tag i v e n
¾ij, the optimal level of exchanges exceeds the number of possible two-way
exchanges, every intermediary has an incentive to undercut, and Bertrand
competition reduces ¾ij and ·ij until every intermediary can carry out the
optimal number of transactions. On the other hand, if inventories are too
small to perform all possible two-way exchanges, intermediaries can increase
their ¾ij and at the same time their inventory without loosing transactions,
until either ¾ij reaches the threat point of consumer-producers, or all two-way
exchanges can be accommodated. For further analysis, mainly the second










(Vi (i) ¡ ¾ijU ¡ ¯i ¡ Vi (j))¼ij (i) > max
l
(Vi (l) ¡ ¯l ¡ Vi (j))¼jl(l)
In addition, an indi¤erence condition between role choices is required.
This implies that
Wij (·ij) ¸ ·ijU + Vi ([i + 1]modN) (7)
whenever ºij > 0, i.e. whenever ij-intermediaries are active. Also,
U + Vi ([i + 1]modN) ¸ max
j6=i
Wij (1) (8)
must hold. (7) and (8) simply say that no intermediary should have an
incentive to become a consumer-producer and no consumer-producer should
want to become an intermediary. As the discount rate tends to 1,i tc a n
be shown that the two inequalities converge, and in the limit, they can be
rewritten as
c Wij (·ij)=b Vi ([i + 1]modN)
17where c Wij (·ij) and b Vi ([i + 1]modN) represent the long-run average values
of intermediaries and consumer-producers, respectively.9
In addition, in a steady state, the distribution of inventories and role
























































































Here, an i-agent’s production good has to be treated separately from all
other goods he may hold as an inventory. Condition (9) can be explained
as follows: ¹0
ij is the set of ij-agents who are unsuccessful in trading with







kl¿i(j;l)¿k (l;j) of these is un-
successful in bilateral exchange as well.
N X
l=1
Ái (l;j)¼lj (j)¹il is the mea-












kj¿i (l;j)¿k (j;l) acquires good j through a bilateral
9For simplicity, I will later use the no-discounting version of this condition.
18match. Similarly, ¹i;i+1 can be decomposed into those agents who were un-
successful in trading, and those who were able to consume after visiting an
intermediary, or after a successful bilateral meeting. Since holding one’s own
consumption good stands at the beginning of any sequence of trades, no
agent will trade in his inventory for good i + 1.
Trading probabilities for trade with intermediaries can be derived from





















respectively, simply the maximum possible measure of two-way transactions
divided by the measure of agents wishing to perform the same transaction.







, this is reduced to ¼ij (i)=
ºij·ij




. If the total inventory of intermediaries
ºij·ij is exactly su¢cient to carry out the maximum number of possible
two-way transactions, then these probabilities are reduced to

























3.4 Steady state equilibrium
Building on the previous sections, a stationary equilibrium of this economy
is de…ned as follows:
De…nition: A stationary equilibrium consists of
©
¹ij;ºij;Á i;· ij;¾ ij;¿i
ªN
i;j=1
19satisfying, for all i;j:
(i) Optimality and Stationarity of intermediaries’ inventories ·ij
and ¾ij: Condition (4) must hold.
(ii) Optimality of Ái and ¿i: Ái and ¿i maximize the set of Bellman





(iii) Bertrand competition of intermediaries: Condition (6) must hold





i;j=1: Conditions (9) and (10) must hold.
The existence of an equilibrium can be proved by a …xed point argument
along the lines of Aiyagari and Wallace (1991). In the next section, I will
derive and characterize some types of equilibria. The following proposition
states some useful characteristics which any stationary equilibrium satis…es:
Proposition 3: (i) In a stationary equilibrium, the measure of consumer-




















(ii) as ® ! 0: ·ij !1 , ºij ! 0,a n d¾ij ! 1 ¡ ± + (¯i+¯j)±
U .
(i) follows from the de…nition of stationarity: The measure of consump-
tion of good i must equal the measure of production of good i. (ii) is less
immediate, but follows from conditions (4) and (6),a sw e l la sf r o mt h ei n -
di¤erence of role choices. As the decreasing returns disappear, the optimal
inventory becomes in…nite, competition lets the sets of intermediaries tend
to 0, and the ”bite” charged tends to a minimum sustainable level.
4C o m m o d i t y M o n e y
In this section, I discuss the development of media of exchange as an equi-
librium property of the economy outlined above. The concept of money
referred to in this context is commodity money, i.e. a good which is used
by all consumer-producers for indirect exchange. It can be noted that in-
troducing intermediation in this way widens the possible set of equilibria of
20this economy from the one originally studied in Kiyotaki and Wright. If no
agent acts as an intermediary, it is weakly optimal for consumer-producers
not to visit an intermediary. But then, no agent has an incentive for becom-
ing intermediary and trade will only take place in bilateral meetings. Thus,
any steady-state equilibrium of the original Kiyotaki-Wright economy can
be supported as an equilibrium of this economy with intermediation, setting
ºij = ·ij = ¾ij =0and Ái (j;k)=0 ,f o ra l li;j;k. This reduces the equilib-






As the properties of monetary equilibria in the pure search economy have
been studied extensively by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and Aiyagari and
Wallace (1991), their main results will only brie‡y be reviewed here. The
purpose of this section is to contrast the de…nitions and equilibrium char-
acteristics of commodity money of the intermediated economy with those
resulting from pure search. In a similar way, I will compare implications
for Cash-in-Advance constraints in the two cases. A commodity money or a
Cash-in-Advance constraint is de…ned as a property of an equilibrium strat-
egy pro…le, and as such they must satisfy the optimality condition. For the
non-intermediated economy, a commodity money is a good that is always ac-
cepted by all consumer-producers of the economy. A strategy pro…le entails
a Cash-in-Advance constraint, if in every exchange, the commodity money is





i;j=1 has good m as a universally





i;j=1 results in a ”Cash-in-Advance” constraint for some good
m,i f m is a universally accepted medium of exchange, and if, for all i;j;l;k :
¹ij¹kl¿?
i (j;l)¿?
k (l;j)=0whenever j 6= m or l 6= m.
As opposed to the storage cost economy studied in the afore mentioned
papers, no general conclusions can be drawn about the existence of equilibria
with commodity money in the transaction cost economy. Here, an equilib-
rium without intermediaries, with a medium of exchange may fail to exist:
for this purpose, it su¢ces to note that if there is a good i,w h i c hi sn e v e ra c -
cepted for the purpose of indirect exchange, only i-producers will hold it, and
an i-consumer will be indi¤erent between holding the medium of exchange
and holding i¡1, the good consumed by i-producers. But then, i-consumers
will not accept the medium of exchange in exchange for good i¡1 (a simple
3-good economy as studied by Kiyotaki and Wright provides an example for
21this case). On the other hand, if every good is produced at least by two
types of consumers, then there is always a bene…t from accepting the com-
mon medium of exchange, and, in principle, any good could be supported as
a universally accepted medium of exchange.10
Along similar lines, one can show that an equilibrium with a Cash-in-
Advance constraint cannot exist for this economy, unless direct transaction
costs are su¢ciently high to prevent agents from any indirect trade of ”goods”
for ”goods”: A Cash-in-Advance constraint implies that any agent must …rst
acquire the medium of exchange, before he can acquire his own consumption
good. There will be an advantage in terms of expected waiting time for
holding one good rather than the other, giving agents an incentive to trade
”goods” for ”goods”, which only high transaction costs may prevent. The
Cash-in-Advance constraint breaks down because the existing search frictions
give consumer-producers an incentive to trade ”goods” for ”goods” in an
attempt to reduce expected waiting time.
I want to contrast these results with monetary and Cash-in-Advance equi-
libria of the intermediated economy. It is straight-forward to consider equi-
libria of the following type: For a medium of exchange m,t h e r ee x i s tN ¡ 1
sets of im-intermediaries exchanging good m each against their consumption
good i. Consumer-producers always decide to obtain good m …rst, before
they exchange m against their consumption good. Intermediated exchange
in this case leads to the use of a generalized medium of exchange, and re-
sults in a Cash-in-Advance constraint for good m: In order to obtain their
consumption good through an intermediary, consumer-producers must …rst
obtain the medium of exchange.
De…nition: fÁig
N
i=1 exhibits a Cash-in-Advance constraint for some good
m,i ¤ Ái(j;m)=1,a n dÁi (m;0) = 1, for all i;j.
Proposition 4: If transaction costs are small enough, then for any good
m, there exists a stationary equilibrium
©
¹ij;ºij;Á i;· ij;¾ ij;¿i
ªN
i;j=1 in which
10A formal justi…cation of this statement can be found by analyzing the 3-good economy
studied in Kiyotaki and Wright. In their ”speculative equilibrium”, the good that is least
costly to store circulates as common medium of exchange only because it reduces storage
costs for some agents, not because it has a higher liquidity for exchanges. The storage cost
e¤ect falls away in this environment, and can be replicated, only if using the medium of
exchange reduces overall discounted transaction costs - a condition which isn’t satis…ed a
priori. On the other hand, in an environment where every good is produced by more than
one type, accepting a common medium of exchange always increases the probability of
further trade. If storage or transaction costs are su¢ciently small, this e¤ect dominates,
a n di np r i n c i p l e ,a n yg o o dc o u l dt h u sb es u p p o r t e da sac o m m o nm e d i u mo fe x c h a n g e .
22fÁig
N
i=1 exhibits a Cash-in-Advance constraint for m.
In this equilibrium, the medium of exchange is the result of the interme-
diaries’ strategies: Their coordination favors one good for the use in indirect
exchange. Intermediaries can deliver this good much quicker than the search
market. If transaction costs are small enough, Bertrand competition among
intermediaries guarantees that the bene…ts of intermediation exceed its costs,
so that consumer-producers have no incentive to deviate from the proposed
trading sequence. The next result discusses how the commodity money for
exchange with intermediaries a¤ects bilateral trade:
Proposition 5: (i) The measure of bilateral trades involving the com-
modity money is 0.
(ii) If the probabilities of trading with an intermediary are su¢ciently
close to 1 for an agent holding his production good, he will never accept to
trade in a bilateral meeting.
(i) is motivated as follows: If an agent holding the medium of exchange
meets some other agent in a random bilateral meeting, he will only accept to
exchange for his own consumption good, say i. But any agent holding good i
would have visited an im-intermediary as well (i.e. the same intermediary as
the im-agent would have visited). Since consumer-producers strictly prefer
the equilibrium trading sequence to any other possible trading sequence, it
must be that the im-intermediaries had su¢cient inventory so that with
probability 1,e i t h e rt h eim-agent or the i-holding agent could have traded
with the intermediary. It follows that they cannot meet in a bilateral random
match.
(ii) follows from the fact that, if ¼jm(m) is close to 1, Vi (j) is close
to (Vi (m) ¡ ¯m)
±¼jm(m)
1¡±+±¼jm(m), and the advantage of holding one good over
another for exchange with intermediaries disappears. As soon as the cost
of the additional transaction outweighs this gain, no good other than the
medium of exchange will be accepted for indirect trade, and trade in bilateral
meetings disappears.
Summing up, the medium of exchange resulting in this type of equilib-
rium is used only in transactions with intermediaries, and it is the result
of strategic interaction of the latter. Outside intermediated exchange, only
”goods” for ”goods” exchange occurs, but this exchange disappears when
intermediation is su¢ciently e¢cient in exchanging the production good for
the medium of exchange. In this case, the Cash-in-Advance constraint holds
universally for all exchanges in the economy. From proposition 3(ii),w ek n o w
23that as ® goes to 0, all measures of intermediaries converge to 0. Proposi-
tion 5 raises the question, whether, as ® goes to 0, it is possible that an
equilibrium exhibits approximate ”market-clearing”, in the sense that the
probabilities of succeeding to trade with an intermediary converge to 1 for
all exchanges? This would imply that all agents are always able to carry out
their most preferred intermediated exchange.
Proposition 6: As ® ! 0, no Cash-in-Advance equilibrium exhibits ap-
proximate market-clearing.
This result follows directly from proposition 3(i): The measure of consumer-
producers consuming at any given time must be constant across types and




N ¡ maxj ºjm
¢
< 1
2N. In an equilibrium with a
Cash-in-Advance constraint, there exists no set of intermediaries consuming
the medium of exchange m. In addition, all m-agents only pursue one ex-
change. In contradiction, market-clearing would imply that the measure of
m-consumer-producers consuming at any given time converges to 1
N.
The impossibility of complete ”market-clearing” is the result of a dise-
quilibrium in trade sequences: In an equilibrium with a Cash-in-Advance
constraint, the producers of the commodity money and the consumers of it
only trade once in order to consume, while all other agents trade at least twice
between production and consumption. Thus, for goods m and m + 1,t h e
commodity money equilibrium creates an imbalance in the underlying equal-
ity of demand and supply which has been assumed for this model if markets
were Walrasian. Obviously, this result would not be robust, if the speci…ca-
tion of pricing were altered in such a way that intermediaries could change
prices to equate the aggregate quantities demanded and supplied for each
transaction. Nevertheless, proposition 6 provides an important insight: the
liquidity demand for the medium of exchange distorts such market-clearing
prices away from underlying Walrasian prices.
While complete market-clearing is impossible in equilibrium, further char-
acterization of Cash-in-Advance equilibria with intermediaries shows that as
® goes to 0, the probabilities of trading with an intermediary converge to 1
for all jm-a n dmj-exchanges, except where m + 1 is exchanged against m
(m-agents selling their production good), and where m is exchanged against
m¡1 (m¡1 agents selling their production good). In other words, in all mar-
kets, where the commodity money does not perturb the underlying equality
between supply and demand, approximate market-clearing occurs.
For the full characterization of the Cash-in-Advance equilibrium with
intermediaries, it is useful to assume …rst that no trade will take place in
24bilateral meetings. As previously argued, this will be satis…ed in equilibrium,
if trading probabilities go to 1. Taking an arbitrary good m as the medium of
exchange, and taking the measures of intermediaries ºjm (su¢ciently small)
as given for all j 6= m,a n dºlm =m a x j ºjm, one can conjecture the following
about the probabilities of trade with intermediaries:
Type: i= m m+1 … l-1 l l+1 … m-2 m-1
π i+1,m(m) <1 <1 … <1 1 1 … 1
π im(i) 1… 1 1 < 1 … < 1 < 1
Figure 2: Transaction probabilities
One …rst conjectures ¼m+1;m(m) < 1 and ¼m¡1;m (m) < 1. This implies
¼m+1;m (m + 1)=1 and ¼m¡1;m(m ¡ 1) < 1. Now, by proposition 3, either
¼i+1;m(m) < 1 or ¼im (i) < 1 for any i,s u c ht h a tºim <º lm.G i v e n t h e
structure of the table so far, at least for one type of agents i,o n em u s t
have ¼i+1;m (m)=¼im (i)=1, and by proposition 3, this can only be at
l.11 By consequence, for i = m;m + 1;:::l ¡ 1, ¼i+1;m (m) < 1 and for
i = l + 1;:::;(m + N ¡ 1)modN, ¼im (i) < 1.
Using this conjecture, one can easily …nd a stationary inventory distribu-
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lows that for i = m + 1;:::l ¡ 1, ¹i;i+1 = 1








i = l+1;:::;(m + N ¡ 1)modN, ¹im = 1







has ¹m;m+1 = 1
N and ¹m¡1;m = 1
N ¡ ºm¡1;m. This completely describes the
stationary inventory distribution.
To complete the characterization of the Cash-in-Advance equilibrium,
one must consider the indi¤erence condition between role choices (9),t h e
11If maxj ºjm as attained at more than one type, say j and l,t h e n¼j+1;m (m)=
¼jm(j)=1and ¼l+1;m (m)=¼lm(l)=1 . This adds some indeterminacy to the trading
probabilities and consequently, the resulting stationary inventory distributions for types
i = j +1 ;:::;l ¡ 1, but as the measures of agents acquiring their consumption good are
constant across types and are determined by maxj ºjm, the overall characterization of the
equilibrium remains unchanged
25optimality condition on inventories (4), and the condition (8) on ºjm that the
aggregate inventory of intermediaries is su¢cient to carry out the maximal
possible number of trades. For the indi¤erence condition on role choices, it is
advisable to consider the case of no discounting, where long-run averages are
compared. The inequalities then collapse to an equality that the long-run
average consumption of consumer-producers must be equal in value to the
per period pay-o¤ of an intermediary. In the case of the Cash-in-Advance
equilibrium, this yields the following conditions in ¾im, ºim,a n d·im,f o re a c h
i 6= m:
2®·im (¯i + ¯m) ¸ ¾imU ¡ (¯i + ¯m) ¸ 2®(·im ¡ 1)(¯i + ¯m) (11)


















For i = m ¡ 1, (12) is replaced by
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One can now substitute (13) into (12) to …nd that




= ¾imU¡(¯i + ¯m)¡®(·im ¡ 1)(¯i + ¯m)
It follows from further simple manipulation that ºlm =m a x j ºjm if ¯l =
max
j6=m;m¡1
¯j, i.e. the good with the highest transaction costs will require the
largest set of intermediaries. In addition, one can easily show that there
exists a unique solution f¾im;ºim;· imgi6=m,s u c ht h a t(11)-(13) are satis…ed.
Moreover, since ºim ! 0 as ® ! 0,i tf o l l o w st h a t¼im (m) ! 1 for all
i 6= m + 1 and ¼im (i) ! 1 for all i 6= m ¡ 1. Thus, for su¢ciently low
®, no trade will occur in bilateral meetings. Proposition 7 summarizes the
characterization of the Cash-in-Advance equilibria with intermediaries:





i;j=1 for any good m, such that the follow-
ing are true:
(i) f¾im;ºim;· imgi6=m is the unique solution to (11)-(13)







and ¹i;i+1 = 1






for i = l + 1;:::;(m + N ¡ 1)modN, ¹im = 1













,w h e r eºlm =m a x j ºjm
¹m;m+1 = 1
N and ¹m¡1;m = 1
N ¡ ºm¡1;m
(iii) Trading probabilities for exchanges with intermediaries are close to
1 for all except ¼m+1;m (m) and ¼m¡1;m(m ¡ 1), and as a consequence, all
exchange goes through intermediaries.
In the pure search economy without intermediation, the Cash-in-Advance
constraint failed to capitalize because goods were endogenously characterized
by their qualities for indirect exchange. There was a considerable probability
that the most preferred transaction could not be carried out immediately, and
agents were unable to direct their search towards a predetermined sequence
of transactions. In the intermediated economy, the medium of exchange
results from the strategic interaction of intermediaries. Consumer-producers
can direct their strategy towards a predetermined sequence of trades, in this
case the one imposed by intermediaries. As the intermediaries become more
and more e¢cient in carrying out exchanges, consumer-producers are able to
almost immediately carry out the exchange proposed by the trade sequence.
Holding a particular good at time t becomes equivalent in value to exchanging
it against the next good of the trading sequence at time t + 1.I nt h eC a s h -
in-Advance equilibrium, any good can almost directly be exchanged against
the commodity money, so that there is no incentive to reduce search frictions
by goods-for-goods trade, as in the pure search model.
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the transaction pattern
in a Cash-in-Advance equilibrium. In addition to the Cash-in-Advance equi-
librium, other equilibria with intermediation exist. Any network of interme-
diaries that gives every consumer-producer exactly one trading sequence by
which he can acquire his consumption good, can be supported as an equilib-
rium (as long as transaction costs are su¢ciently small). It follows that there
must be at least N ¡ 1 sets of intermediaries operating in equilibrium. For
12Equilibrium representation: An arrow from i to j represents the activity of ij-
intermediaries. Trading strategies can always follow an arrow, but move against it, only







Figure 3: Cash-in-Advance equilibrium12
example, one can consider the following few alternative examples of interme-
diation networks. I shall not proceed at a full equilibrium characterization,
since most of them can be analyzed using similar techniques as above:
(i) for i = 1;:::;N ¡ 1,t h e r ee x i s ti;i + 1-intermediaries. In this case, all
agents trade their production good directly against their consumption good,
except for type N, who trade good 1 for good 2,t h e n3, etc. until they
receive good N.
(ii) for i = l + 1;:::;m ¡ 1, there exist im-intermediaries, and for i =
m;:::;l ¡ 1,t h e r ee x i s til-intermediaries. In this case, both good l and good
m are locally used as medium of exchange. Good l is used by agents of types
m to l¡1,g o o dm is used by types l to m¡1.T y p el acts as a middleman,
who exchanges his production good l + 1 for the medium of exchange m,
and then exchanges m against his consumption good l, which acts also as a
medium of exchange.
(iii) for i = 1;:::;m ¡ 1, there exist i;i + 1-intermediaries, and for i =
m+1;:::;N,t h e r ee x i s tim-intermediaries. This is a mixture of case (i) and
the Cash-in-Advance equilibrium. Types 1 to m ¡ 1 trade their production
good directly against their consumption good, type N trades good 1 for good
2,t h e ng o o d3 and so on, until he receives the medium of exchange m,w h i c h
is used as in the Cash-in-Advance equilibrium by types m to N ¡ 1.
(iv) as the Cash-in-Advance equilibrium, with the di¤erence that m;m+

































Figure 7: Alternative Cash-in-Advance equilibrium
30main una¤ected, since all agents trading m for m + 1 immediately consume
thereafter. This represents an alternative version of the Cash-in-Advance
equilibrium.
Obviously it is possible to consider equilibria of type (ii) with more than
two local media of exchange, or to consider other combinations of these net-
works.
5 E¢ciency and Minimal Coalition Proofness
The previous discussion of Cash-in-Advance equilibria with and without in-
termediaries raises the problem of multiple equilibria, selection of a medium
of exchange, and coordination of strategies. In this context, I shall also
consider the welfare properties of the various equilibria. In related models
without intermediaries, resulting Nash equilibria may be ine¢cient because
of a coordination failure: agents cannot explicitly coordinate their actions to
agree on a Pareto-e¢cient equilibrium. A second form of ine¢ciency arises
from when some coordinated strategy pro…le Pareto-dominates the equilib-
rium, but is not individually rational (see, for example, the discussion in
Aiyagari and Wallace, 1991). In this section, I show that the coordination
problem and the discussion of welfare properties can be considered as re-
lated problems in an intermediated economy. For this purpose, I introduce
a re…nement of Nash equilibrium strategies in the form of minimal coalition
proofness.
In pure search economies, a Pareto-improving change in the equilibrium
strategy pro…le can only be induced by a measure of agents that is strictly
positive and bounded away from 0. I will argue here that, as long as a Pareto-
improvement results from a change in the decisions Ái on what intermediaries
to visit, this change can be enforced by an arbitrarily small set of agents
who coordinate their actions as intermediaries. For instance, a small set of
agents may become intermediaries and coordinate their actions with some
small set of consumer-producers. By doing so, the intermediaries o¤ers a
higher life-time utility to both their clients and to themselves. This gives
the opportunity to all other agents to deviate from their initial strategy
pro…le to take advantage of the higher life-time utility o¤ered by the new
intermediaries. The old equilibrium is then no longer stable and will be
replaced by a new one. This type of coordination is more explicit than
the one resulting from Nash equilibrium strategies, however it only requires
coordination of an arbitrarily small, but positive measure of agents.
31More formally, the notion of minimal coalition proofness states that the
minimum set of agents which can increase their life-time utility by coordina-
tion, taking as given the behavior of all other agents of the economy, must
have a measure strictly greater than 0. This leads to the following:
De…nition: A stationary equilibrium
©
¹ij;ºij;Á i;· ij;¾ ij;¿i
ªN
i;j=1 has a
subset S µ ­ with a coordinated deviation (at time ¿), if for each s 2 S,
there exists a plan fÁs (t);· s (t);¾s (t);¿s (t)g
1
t=¿, such that:
(i) given strategies fÁi;· ij;¾ij;¿ig
N
i;j=1 followed by agents in ­¡S,s t r a t e -
gies fÁs (t);· s (t);¾s (t);¿s (t)g
1
t=¿ for each agent s 2 S, and the resulting
inventory distribution
©
b ¹ij (t);b ºij (t)
ªN
i;j=1, fÁs (t);· s (t);¾s (t);¿s (t)g
1
t=¿ is
weakly preferred to the equilibrium strategies fÁi;· ij;¾ ij;¿ig
N
i;j=1 for each s,
and strictly preferred for some non-zero measure of agents in S.
(ii) given the deviation strategies, and given the resulting inventory dis-
tribution
©
b ¹ij (t);b ºij (t)
ªN
i;j=1, for some ”switching” subset S0 of agents in
­ ¡S, the equilibrium strategies fÁi;· ij;¾ij;¿ig
N
i;j=1 are no longer optimal.
De…nition: A stationary equilibrium
©
¹ij;ºij;Á i;· ij;¾ ij;¿i
ªN
i;j=1 is min-
imally coalition proof, if for every sequence of subsets of agents Sn with a
coordinated deviation, and such that ¹(Sn) ! 0, the sequence of measures
of the corresponding ”switching” subsets also converges to 0.
The previous de…nition of minimal coalition proofness combines elements
of general coalition-proofness with evolutionary stability. As in evolutionary
stability, we consider whether changes in strategies by an arbitrarily small set
of agents can eventually lead to changes of strategies of the entire population.
We restrict ourselves, however, in the set of strategy changes that we con-
sider, by considering coalitions of agents who ”coordinate” their actions such
that given the status quo, all deviators can bene…t. From the perspective of
general coalition-proofness, we restrict our attention to coalitions of arbitrar-
ily small size. Clearly, minimal coalition-proofness is weaker as a selection
mechanism than either evolutionary stability or general coalition-proofness.
According to this de…nition, the deviation plan need not be stationary. This
is essential for considering the transition from one stationary equilibrium to
another.
I now turn to the de…nition of constrained Pareto-e¢ciency for the pur-
pose of this economy. Intuitively, arbitrarily small deviations from an ine¢-
cient equilibrium can only enforce a Pareto improvement, if they include some
32changes in the intermediation network. This excludes possible ine¢ciencies
resulting from the transactions in bilateral search meetings. However, in an
equilibrium, in which all agents trade with intermediaries with very high
probability, the resulting strategies ¿i are prescribed by the network of in-
termediaries, and can have only minor welfare implications. Thus, I restrict
attention to Pareto ine¢ciencies resulting from the intermediation network:
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Proposition 8: Any minimally coalition-proof equilibrium is constrained
Pareto-e¢cient.
This result is quite natural: If some Pareto improvement can be imple-
mented by a change in the intermediation network, then groups of interme-
diaries and consumer-producers can implement this change on a small scale,
and increase their personal welfare. Everyone else now individually has an
interest in changing to the new strategies.
This result diverges from the main results on search economies without
intermediaries, where the continuity of objective functions with respect to
strategies meant that small deviations change overall utility only marginally.
Changes in the intermediation network may lead to discontinuous changes
in pay-o¤s, and thus to strategy changes by large parts of the population.
From a historical perspective, small deviating coalitions can be viewed as an
innovation mechanism: Someone proposes a new system for organizing his
transactions. If others …nd that this arrangement is e¢cient, they will also
start using it. As media of exchange, and more generally trading strategies
are complementary across agents, everyone will start using the new system,
if it leads to a Pareto-improvement. It becomes clear from the previous
discussion, that intermediation is essential in promoting an innovation in the
system of exchanges.
The converse of proposition 7 does not hold generally: An equilibrium
may be Pareto-e¢cient, but not minimally coalition-proof, if the imple-
mented changes lead to welfare losses for agents who don’t participate in
the change. In the context of intermediated, monetary exchanges, some
33agents may strictly prefer the old equilibrium over the innovation, but once
the innovation is introduced, they will change, because their trade partners
also start using the new medium of exchange. Loosely speaking, di¤erent
media of exchange are substitutes, but there are complementarities in using
a medium of exchange.
What are the implications for the Cash-in-Advance equilibria considered
in the previous section? Clearly, for su¢ciently low transaction costs, any
equilibrium where some agents decide not see an intermediary is not mini-
mally coalition-proof, since not visiting an intermediary is weakly dominated,
and since there is a possibility to o¤er pro…table intermediation. But what
can be said about Cash-in-Advance equilibria with intermediation, or about
the other intermediation networks considered at the end of the preceding
section?
If transaction costs are su¢ciently small, any minimally coalition-proof
equilibrium must enable all agents to trade at most twice in order to consume,
and as decreasing returns disappear, probabilities of trade with intermedi-
aries must converge to 1 for all agents trading twice. Otherwise, the equilib-
rium would be Pareto-dominated by a Cash-in-Advance equilibrium. Also,
a mixed strategy equilibrium cannot be minimally coalition-proof: A mixed
strategy equilibrium leaves some agents indi¤erent between two transaction
sequences with generically di¤erent expected transaction costs and delays of
consumption. For the trading sequence with lower transaction costs, some
trading probability is smaller than 1. Slightly increasing the total amount of
intermediation for this exchange is feasible for a small group of agents and
will lead to a higher trading probability, thus breaking the indi¤erence and
inducing a large measure of agents to switch.
It follows that an intermediation network of a minimally coalition-proof
equilibrium consists of exactly N ¡ 1 sets of intermediaries.13 N ¡ 2 types
trade twice, while the remaining two types trade once. If type i and i + 1
both trade twice, they use the same good as a medium of exchange, and
in equilibrium, at most two goods are used for indirect exchange. The re-
maining potential candidates are the Cash-in-Advance equilibrium, and the
equilibrium with two commodity moneys (case (ii) of the previous section),
since calculations along the lines of proposition 7 show that in the latter case,
trading probabilities also converge to 1.
To check these equilibria for minimal coalition-proofness, we shall con-
sider alternative intermediation networks in which (i) t h es a m et y p eo fa g e n t s
13N ¡ 1 is actually the minimum to sustain a complete intermediation network.
34consumes in integer units, and (ii) all agents participating in the deviation
incur (weakly) lower transaction costs. If (i) and (ii) are satis…ed, the alter-
native intermediation network can be implemented by an arbitrarily small
deviation, since reducing transaction costs will also reduce ºij’s and lead
to a reduction in the delay of consumption, thus necessarily to a Pareto-
improvement. (i) and (ii) are also necessary, since otherwise, either the type
initially consuming in integer units would not be willing to participate in a
deviation, or some type would incur higher transaction costs by following the
deviation.
Proposition 9a: (i) A Cash-in-Advance equilibrium of either type with
good 1 (the good with the lowest transaction costs) as medium of exchange is
minimally coalition-proof.
(ii) A Cash-in-Advance equilibrium for any other good m as medium of
exchange is coalition-proof, only if ® is su¢ciently low.
(iii) A Cash-in-Advance equilibrium of the type considered in case (iv) of
the previous section is coalition-proof, only if good 1 is used as a medium of
exchange.
(i) is straight-forward, since no agent would want to use a good other
than the one with the lowest transaction cost as a medium of exchange.
(ii) and (iii) follow from considering a deviation of i1-intermediaries, for
i = m + 1;:::;N and 1m-intermediaries. The deviation triggered leads to an
equilibrium with two media of exchange, one of which is good 1, the other
good m.14 One conclusion from the proof of (ii) is that if ¯1 =0 , only the
Cash-in-Advance equilibrium for good 1 is minimally coalition-proof.
The conclusions for two-money equilibria are similar. As in the previous
description of the two-money equilibrium, let l be the type consuming in
integer units. Then the following holds:
Proposition 9b: A two-money equilibrium is coalition-proof, if and only
if ¯l <¯ m and there exists no type k using good l as a medium of exchange,
such that ¯k <¯ l.
Thus, a minimally coalition-proof equilibrium either has a Cash-in-Advance
constraint, or has two media of exchange. In either case, trading probabil-
ities converge to 1. What importance can be attached to the minimally
coalition-proof equilibria where good 1 is not a universally accepted medium
14In (iii), the deviation considered is slightly di¤erent, and leads to a two-money equi-
librium with 1 and m +1being used as moneys.
35of exchange? In all minimally coalition-proof equilibria, one type i of agents
does not o¤er any intermediation, and as a consequence, consumes his con-
sumption good in integer units. Due to the special assumptions about con-
sumption and production in this model, a deviating coalition can impose a
good as universal medium of exchange, only if a full Pareto improvement is
implemented by the deviation. Type i agents will never accept to participate
in a deviation in which they o¤er some intermediation, since this strictly
reduces their utility. This explains why some of the two-money equilibria
cannot be broken.
The result is reversed when a strict subset of types can coordinate a
deviation, without including the type i who doesn’t o¤er intermediation. As
an example, this could occur in a more generalized version of this economy
where i-consumers are subdivided into di¤erent types of producers, such that
each good is produced by at least two types of consumers. Under certain
conditions, this implies a unique minimally coalition-proof equilibrium with
a Cash-in-Advance constraint for good 1.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has developed a modi…ed version of the traditional search econ-
omy model of monetary exchange. The introduction of intermediaries leads
to two main results. First, intermediaries can induce the use of a common
medium of exchange. As such, intermediation and money are complemen-
tary phenomena. Strategic interaction of intermediaries may lead to Cash-
in-Advance constraints, such that trade sequences with intermediaries follow
the well-known pattern that ”goods buy money and money buys goods, but
goods don’t buy goods” (Clower 1965). As opposed to many other models
of monetary exchange, this pattern is a result and not an assumption of the
model. The second central result is that the characteristics of a monetary
equilibrium with intermediaries di¤er fundamentally from those of equilib-
rium models without intermediaries. By forming coalitions, intermediaries
can coordinate and lead the economy out of an ine¢cient equilibrium. Re-
sulting exchanges are such that every type of agent trades at most twice
in order to consume, once to acquire the medium of exchange and once to
acquire his consumption good.
A series of questions cannot be properly addressed within the framework
of this model. The very special assumptions about production and consump-
tion that are used here lend themselves for easy analysis, but also have some
36drawbacks. As previously discussed, the intuitively most appealing result
that small, coordinated deviations necessarily induce the use of the most
e¢cient medium of exchange throughout the entire economy can only be de-
r i v e di nas e t t i n gi nw h i c has u c c e s s f u ld e v i a t i o nn e e dn o td e p e n do nt h e
participation of consumers of all types.
Most importantly, the choice of production and consumption activities
remains unaddressed. As in many related models, I have simply assumed the
existence of an underlying Walrasian equilibrium, which in the absence of
search frictions also represents an optimum. Production and Consumption
choices are exogenously given in such a way that in a frictionless economy,
all markets would clear at the relative prices of 1. Assuming the existence of
such an equilibrium is not trivial per se. It is far from evident to assume that
prices will correspond to the market clearing prices of a frictionless economy,
as they would be the result of some bilateral bargaining process. As we
have seen in proposition 6, the liquidity demand for the medium of exchange
distorts market-clearing prices away from the Walrasian equilibrium. It is
even more problematic to assume that consumption and production decisions
do not depend on decisions about trade. It seems appealing to think that
decision-makers take into consideration their opportunities for trade when
they decide what goods to produce or to consume. Agents may decide to
produce one good because it is easy to trade, even though they are more
e¢cient at producing a di¤erent, less marketable good. This problem does
not appear, however, in discussions on exchange in decentralized economies.
Finally, it should be noted that the model presented here relies on some
fairly ad hoc assumptions about intermediation. The peculiar assumptions
about intermediaries’ inventories and trade can be motivated by the attempt
to implement a sequential service constraint15 in this simple discrete-time
framework, and by the necessity of avoiding the problems of price theory in
decentralized markets. The idea that a limit to intermediation generates a
need for intermediaries to introduce a common medium of exchange requires
more re‡ection. Precisely which technical restrictions a¤ect the behavior of
intermediaries, and how can they alter an exogenously given environment?
While such constraints are taken as given in this context, further thought is
needed in order to assess the validity of the way intermediation is introduced
15Such a constraint seems essential to understanding the inventory and turn-over of
goods in an economy with decentralized exchange with or without intermediation, and in
the latter case, to examine the intermediary’s ability to providing liquidity in the form of
immediate exchange.
37into the search economy here, and the robustness of the results that follow
from it.
In spite of these technical short-comings, the results presented here pro-
vide some more general perspectives on intermediation. The complementar-
ity of the medium of exchange and intermediation, the e¢ciency result, and
the non-stability result for non-intermediated economies all follow from three
basic assumptions about the nature of the economy:
(i) A Pareto-optimal, market-clearing allocation, which would result from
a competitive equilibrium in perfect markets, cannot be attained because of
a form of market imperfection,
(ii) some agents have a technology to alleviate the imperfection by o¤ering
intermediation, and by o¤ering this technology to the economy, they can
make arbitrage pro…ts from a price spread, and
(iii) the success of intermediaries depends crucially on how they can deal
with their own constraints.
In general, we know many reasons for frictions in a competitive economy,
and the many facets of intermediation all respond to these imperfections. In
this paper, I have considered search frictions as the reason for imperfection.
Similarly, credit market imperfections are considered in the literature on …-
nancial intermediation. When these forms of market imperfections arise, in-
termediation performs a screening activity between both sides of the market,
for which a price spread is charged. The success of intermediaries depends
mostly on appropriating a large volume of transactions, and on establish-
ing a repeated, credible interaction with their customers. This transfers the
problems of price-setting and market allocation to the intermediation sector.
Many features traditionally attributed to competitive markets, such as mar-
ket clearing, the use of money and Cash-in-Advance constraints, can thus
be explained as being in the interest of intermediaries who organize market
exchange to alleviate an imperfection and take arbitrage gains from it.
Beyond these implications for the theory of intermediation, the results
developed here also have some implications for existing Walrasian macroe-
conomic and monetary theory. The intermediation model combines friction-
less market transactions a la Walras with an explicit, bilateral structure of
exchanges. In addition, intermediation provides a channel, by which price-
setting and information transmission can plausibly be discussed (although
this exceeds the limits of this paper). It is hoped that extensions and simpli-
…cations of the intermediation model may prove useful to analyze questions
38in monetary and macroeconomic theory for which the existing theory has
come to its limits due to the ad hoc structure of monetary exchange.
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7 Appendix: Selected Proofs
Proof of proposition 1: I …rst show that (1)-(3) can be equivalently refor-
mulated as a Bellman equation. Existence of an optimal strategy are then
easily obtained, as well as the fact that an optimal inventory plan must be
non-decreasing. Because of the discontinuity in (3), the …rst step of this proof
becomes possible only after the following short lemma:




































Now, de…ne <+ as the state space of inventories. The feasibility corre-
spondence ¡ij : <+ !< + is given by:
¡ij (x)=
½





The one-period reward function Fij : <2
+ !< + is given by:





40(1) c a nt h e nb er e w r i t t e na s :













such that, for s = t;t + 1::::
ks+1 2 ¡ij (ks)
¡ij (¢) is non-empty and compact-valued, and Fij (¢;¢) is bounded below
on the set of all (x;y) satisfying y 2 ¡ij (x). It follows that Wij (¢) satis…es
the following Bellman equation:
Wij (x)= s u p
y2¡ij(x)
©




° ([y]) + ±Wij (y)
ª
The conventional solution techniques can now be applied to this Bellman
equation. ¡ij (¢) is monotonic, convex-valued and upper hemi-continuous,
but not continuous, while Fij (x;¢) is right-continuous with …nite left limits,
for all x. The following two lemmas complete the conditions necessary for
characterizing a solution:





¸ ·ij, an optimal continuation
strategy is given by ks+1 = ks+2 = ::: = ·ij.
Proof: (4) implies that ·ij is the maximum number of trades an interme-
diary would be willing to carry out in any given period. It follows from the
linearity of U that it is optimal to consume any excess inventory immediately.
Lemma: For any k ¸ k









Proof: Any optimal plan starting from k
0
is feasible from k,a n dy i e l d s





It follows that intermediaries will never accumulate or keep an inventory
higher than what is necessary to satisfy their most preferred number of trades.
[0;· ij] can be used as the state space, and is obviously compact. Wij (¢) is
strictly increasing.
To establish existence, and to characterize Wij (¢), one can now use the
Bellman operator. Standard results imply that the Bellman operator has
41Wij (¢) as a unique …xed point in the space B ([0;· ij]) of increasing, bounded
functions from [0;· ij] into <+.R e w r i t i n gWij (x) yields:
Wij (x)= s u p
y2¡ij(x)
©




° ([y]) + ±Wij (y)
ª
= Ux+s u p
y2¡ij(x)
©




° ([y]) + ±Wij (y)
ª
De…ne f?
ij (¢) by: f?
ij (x)=Wij (x) ¡ Ux,s ot h a t
f
?
ij (x)= s u p
y2¡ij(x)
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From its de…nition, f?
ij (x) is a non-decreasing step function. For given x,
the supremum in f?
ij (x) and Wij (x) exists and, upon inspection, must be at
one of at most countably many discontinuities, since Fij (x;y) is decreasing





,a sl o n ga s[y] · ·ij,w h e r e
·ij is given by (4). ¤
Proof of lemma 1: Consider the following recursively de…ned plan of
inventories: at T,c h o o s ek + 1,a tT ¡ 1,c h o o s e(k + 1)(1 ¡ ¾ij),a n df o r
T ¡1¡t,c h o o s e(k + 1)(1 ¡ ¾ij)¡tk¾ij. In words, this inventory plan con-
sumes any unneeded inventory in the …rst period, and then lets the inventory
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Now, since T is the minimum number of periods needed to increase invento-
ries, one has that ¾ij ¸ 1 ¡ Tk¾ij. Substituting for ¾ij completes the proof.
Proof of proposition 9a: (i) and (ii) are straight-forward. A Cash-in-
Advance constraint for good m is destabilized as proposed in the text, by a
deviation of i1-intermediaries, for i = m+1;:::;Nand 1m-intermediaries. For
this deviation to be feasible, it is necessary that the additional transaction
cost ¯1 is more than o¤set by the increase in the frequency of consumption
from 1
2 (1 ¡ maxl ºlk) to 1



























U ¡ ¯m+1 ¡ ¯m
¢
so that again, m+1-agents will have an incentive to follow the deviation.¤
Proof of proposition 9b: Clearly, a deviation is possible only towards
a two-money equilibrium with good l and some other medium of exchange. If
¯m >¯ l, a deviation towards a Cash-in-Advance equilibrium for good l (or,
a fortiori, to a two-money equilibrium with good 1 and good l) is feasible. If
¯m · ¯l, a deviation towards a two-money equilibrium is possible only if the
second medium of exchange is some good k, where initially type k uses good
l as medium of exchange, and ¯k <¯ l.I ft y p ek used good m as medium of
exchange, the deviation would imply types ”between” k and m to switch to a
medium of exchange with higher transaction costs (from m to l). If ¯k ¸ ¯l,
the deviation would imply higher transaction costs for those switching from
the use of l to k.¤
Note: Proofs for the remaining propositions (except prop. 4) follow di-
rectly from the arguments given in the text. The proof of proposition 4 can
be established by a …xed point argument similar to the one in Aiyagari and
Wallace (1991).
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